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Abstract: This paper assesses the implications for optimal discretionary monetary 
policy if the slope of the Phillips curve changes. The paper first derives a ‘switching’ 
Phillips curve from the optimal pricing decision of a monopolistic firm that faces a 
changing cost of price adjustment. Two states exists, a state with a high cost of price 
adjustment that generates a ‘flat’ Phillips curve and a low-cost state that generates a 
relatively ‘steep’ curve. The second aspect of the paper constructs a utility-based 
welfare criterion. A novel feature of this criterion is that it has a relative weight on 
output gap deviations that is state dependent, so it changes with the cost of price 
adjustment. Optimal monetary policy is computed subject to the switching-Phillips 
curve under both ad-hoc and utility-based welfare criteria.  The utility-based criterion 
instructs monetary policy to disregard the slope of the Phillips curve and keep its 
systematic actions constant across different states. This stands in contrast to the 
prescription coming under the ad-hoc criterion, which advises monetary policy to 
change its systematic behavior according to the slope of the Phillips curve. 
 
 
Keywords: Optimal monetary policy, Phillips curve, regime-switching 
 




*Research Department, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, Troy.Davig@kc.frb.org.  
I thank Roberto Billi, Andrea Raffo, Jon Willis, and especially Eric Leeper for 
comments. I also thank Brent Bundick for research assistance. The views expressed 
herein are solely those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the 
Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City or the Federal Reserve System. 1. Introduction
The slope of the Phillips curve is an important parameter in the minds of policymakers.
Empirical evidence suggests a ‘ﬂattening’ of the Phillips curve in recent decades, indicating
inﬂation has become less responsive to movementsin measures of aggregate economic activity,
such as the output gap.1 Although this phenomenon appears using reduced-form estimation
procedures, as in Atkeson and Ohanian (2001), it also appears using structural approaches
to estimation, as in Smets and Wouters (2007). Competing explanations for the change in
the slope of the Phillips curve include the following, possibly interrelated, set of factors :
better conduct of monetary policy, globalization and changes in the price-setting behavior
of ﬁrms.2 Although each factor may contribute, this paper focuses on the last explanation
and its implications for the conduct of optimal monetary policy.
In particular, this paper models changes in the degree of price stickiness at the level of a
monopolistically competitive ﬁrm. The microfoundations of the ﬁrm’s price-setting behavior
are similar to Rotemberg (1982), except the term governing the magnitude of the cost of
price adjustment is state-dependent and subject to change over time. The optimal pricing
equation from this problem yields a nonlinear, or ‘switching’, Phillips curve. The switching-
Phillips curve takes the same form as the forward-looking New Keynesian Phillips curve,
except the coeﬃcients on expected inﬂation and the output gap are state dependent.
A second aspect of the paper assesses the implications for optimal monetary policy un-
der discretion subject to the switching-Phillips curve. An advantage of specifying the mi-
crofoundations of the ﬁrm’s pricing problem is that it makes possible the construction of a
utility-based welfare criterion to evaluate diﬀerent monetary policies. An interesting feature
of the utility-based measure is that it has a state-dependent relative weight on output gap
deviations. The weight changes synchronously with changes in the degree of price stickiness,
indicating higher losses arise due to inﬂation in states with relatively high costs of price
1For example, Atkeson and Ohanian (2001), Roberts (2006) and Williams (2006) document the ﬂattening
of the Phillips curve for the U.S. and Iakova (2007) does the same for the U.K.
2See Mishkin (2007) for an overview.
2adjustment. In other words, inﬂation imposes higher costs on ﬁrms in states with relatively
sticky prices, so it is precisely in these states that monetary policy increases the relative
weight on inﬂation stabilization.
To derive the optimal monetary policy, the central bank optimizes its welfare criterion
subject to the switching-Phillipscurve, yieldingthe optimal targeting rulerelating the output
gap to inﬂation. As a basis for comparison, an ad-hoc welfare criterion is ﬁrst used to derive
the optimal targeting rule. This criterion uses the common assumption that the relative
weight on output gap deviations is constant, as in Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (1999). The
resulting optimal targeting rule directsthe central bank to switchrules, or change its systemic
response to inﬂation, depending on the state. In states with relatively ﬂexible prices, the
Phillips curve is steep and inﬂation is relativelyless costly to ﬁrms. Consequently, the central
bank adjusts the output gap relatively less aggressively to stabilize inﬂation. In states with
a higher cost of price adjustment, inﬂation is more costly, so the central bank adjusts the
output gap more aggressively to stabilize inﬂation. Thus, the systematic response of the
central bank, under the ad-hoc criterion, varies with the state. In similar contexts, this
result can also be found in Blake and Zampolli (2006), Moessner (2006), Zampolli (2006)
and Svensson and Williams (2007). In contrast, the optimal targeting rule using the utility-
based welfare criterion instructs monetary policy to have a constant systematic response to
inﬂation. So the optimal targeting rule does not switch, but is invariant across the diﬀerent
states. This constant systematic response arises due to the oﬀsetting eﬀects of a changing
relative weight in the welfare criterion, which is absent in the ad-hoc speciﬁcation, and
changing slope of the Phillips curve.
Empirical studies ﬁnding the ﬂattening of the Phillips curve, such Lubik and Schorfheide
(2004), Boivin and Giannoni (2006), and Smets and Wouters (2007), estimate variants of a
structural DSGE model. Of course, changes in monetary policy regime can have an impact
on the relationship between inﬂation and output. For example, Roberts (2006) documents
that a change in monetary regime around 1980 is an important factor in understanding the
change in the reduced-form relationship between output and inﬂation. However, structural
3estimates of the slope of the Phillips curvedepend on private sector parameters and are there-
fore, independent of parameters describing monetary policy. Consequently, as Boivin and
Giannoni (2006) and Smets and Wouters (2007) discuss, the change in the slope-coeﬃcient
in the structural Phillips curve can be due to parameters governing price-setting behavior.
Given that empirical evidence suggests a change in the slope of the Phillips curve, then
simply postulating a Phillips curve relation with switching (i.e. state-dependent) coeﬃcients
may have appeal. However, incorporating elements of regime change after solving an opti-
mization problem and linearizing does violence to the microfoundations upon which most
modern macroeconomic models are based. Incorporating regime change into the original
optimization problem, as in this paper, preserves the underlying foundations. In this sense,
the structural relations describing private sector behavior in this paper are restricted relative
to Svensson and Williams (2007), where all parameters in the linearized relations are subject
to change.3 The restrictions in this paper come from microfoundations that take a stand on
which deep parameters change and how these changes manifest themself in the structural
relationships.
In some respect, the ‘ﬂattening’ of the Phillips curve due to greater price setting frictions
seems perverse. More ﬂexibility and competition in goods markets, along with improved
technology for acquiring information and adjusting prices, should work in the opposite di-
rection making prices more ﬂexible. This does appear to present a puzzle. However, as
Mishkin (2007) notes, environments with low and stable inﬂation may lead ﬁrms to conclude
they can increase the average duration they leave their prices ﬁxed with little cost. As a
consequence, the slope of the Phillips curve would decline and inﬂation become less respon-
sive to movements in the output gap as inﬂation in many countries has stabilized. This line
of reasoning suggests a link between aggregate inﬂation and the price setting behavior of
private ﬁrms. Indeed, Rubio-Ramirez and Villaverde (2007) estimate a DSGE model for the
U.S. with time-varying structural parameters and Calvo (1983) price setting. They ﬁnd that
3Although, incorporating state-dependent coeﬃcients into linearized structural relationships is useful for
modeling model uncertainty, as Svensson and Williams (2007) emphasize.
4the average duration between when ﬁrms reoptimize their price increases as the trend of
inﬂation declines, and vice versa. Gal` ı and Gertler (1999) and Cogley and Sbordone (2005)
estimate a Phillips curve relation, also using the Calvo price setting mechanism, across dif-
ferent subsamples. They too ﬁnd longer average duration between price reoptimizations for
more recent subsamples, a period with relatively low and stable inﬂation.4 Ball, Mankiw,
and Romer (1988) provide both cross-country and time series evidence that prices are more
responsive to movements in aggregate demand when inﬂation is relatively high and volatile.
Similarly, Caballero and Engel (1993) present evidence that the degree of price ﬂexibility
does vary with economic conditions and prices were more ﬂexible in the U.S. during the high
and volatile inﬂation of the 1970s. Outside of the U.S., Demery and Duck (2005) present
evidence that the frequency of price adjustment increases in high inﬂation environments in
the UK and Gagnon (2006) does the same for Mexico.
This evidence linking aggregate inﬂation rates to price-setting decisions of ﬁrms suggests
a model where the cost, or frequency, of price adjustment is endogenous and depends on
the aggregate inﬂation rate. Such a model is computationally feasible, but analytically
intractable. Assessing the implications for optimal monetary policy in such a framework
also posses considerable diﬃculty. This paper, as a ﬁrst pass, uses analytic techniques from
Davig and Leeper (2007) to solve rational expectation models with regime change and from
Rotember and Woodford (1997) and Woodford (2003) to compute optimal policies. These
tools allow for sharp analytic characterizations of equilibrium relationships and optimal
policies. For these reasons, linking aggregate inﬂation and the price-setting behavior of
ﬁrms in a serious way is left for future work.5
Optimal monetary policy in the presence of a switching-Phillips curve also diﬀers from
previous work focusing on the implication of switching policy rules, such as Andolfatto
and Gomme (2003), Leeper and Zha (2003), Davig and Leeper (2007), and Chung, Davig
4Cogley and Sbordone (2005) note that formal statistical testing across subsamples, however, cannot
reject a constant Calvo parameter.
5For the model in this paper, an explicit link is made between the volatility of shocks and the cost of
price adjustment. However, this link is to motivate the model speciﬁcation and has no material impact on
either the model dynamics or the optimal monetary policy under discretion.
5and Leeper (2006). These papers posit monetary rules that change regimes exogenously,
while keeping parameters in the relations describing private sector behavior constant. For
example, Davig and Leeper (2007) assesses the implications of a switching ‘simple’ monetary
rule, where an exogenous Markov-chain governs the switching. Private sector parameters
and structural relationships are invariant to the monetary policy rule in place, although the
switching policy process does imply decision rules and pricing functions have coeﬃcients
that switch with the monetary regime. In contrast, this paper posits a framework with
parameters in the forward-looking Phillips curve that are subject to change. Any resulting
changes in the parameters describing monetary policy reﬂect an optimal response to the
changing structure of the economy.
This paper is organized as follows : section 2 derives the switching-Phillips curve un-
der the assumption of switching quadratic costs of price adjustment for a monopolistically
competitive ﬁrm, section 3 illustrates the implications of the switching Phillips curve in a
DSGE model, section 4 solves for the optimal monetary policy under discretion using an
ad-hoc welfare criterion, section 5 solves again the optimal discretionary policy, except using
a utility-based criterion, and section 6 concludes.
2. A Switching Phillips Curve
This section embeds state-dependent parameters into the optimization problem of a mo-
nopolistically competitive ﬁrm. As in Rotemberg (1982), the ﬁrm faces quadratic costs of
adjustment, except the term governing the magnitude of the cost of price adjustment is sub-
ject to change. Introducing changing costs of price adjustment results in a switching-Phillips
curve relation, derived from explicit foundations, with state-dependent coeﬃcients on the
output gap and expected inﬂation.
62.1 Changing Costs of Price Adjustment
The ﬁxed-regime approach, which keeps parameters constant, imposes a cost on monopolistic









where ϕ ≥ 0 is the magnitude of the price adjustment cost, Π denotes the gross steady state
rate of inﬂation and Pt (j) denotes the nominal price set by ﬁrm j.6 The cost is measured
in terms of the ﬁnal good Yt. The assumption of quadratic adjustment costs implies that
ﬁrms change their price every period in the presence of shocks, but will adjust only partially
towards the optimal price the ﬁrm would set in the absence of adjustment costs. As with
any type of quadratic adjustment cost, a ﬁrm prefers a sequence of small adjustments to
very large adjustments in a given period. Alternatively, these costs may vary according to a









where ﬁrms face a state-dependent cost of price adjustment. For st ∈{ 1,2},t h es t a t ee v o l v e s
according to a two-state Markov chain with transition matrix
Π=
 
p11 1 − p11
1 − p22 p22
 
, (3)
with pmn =P r [ St = n|St−1 = m]f o rm,n =1 ,2.7 Changes in the state governing the cost of
price adjustment are exogenous, evolving according to a Markov-chain and are observed by
both private agents and the central bank.
As previously discussed, a case exists that changes in the price-setting friction are linked
to factors such as aggregate volatility and the average inﬂation rate. Monetary policy then
plays a role determining the cost of price adjustment and can indirectly aﬀect this cost by
engaging in policies mitigating aggregate volatility. Boivin and Giannoni (2006) emphasize
6See Ireland (2004) for a detailed treatment of quadratic costs of price adjustment in a DSGE model.
7The assumption of two states, or regimes, is made for convenience and tractability, it can be replaced
with an assumption concerning any ﬁnite number of states.
7that monetary policy post-1980 has indeed been more eﬀective in this respect. However,
monetary policy cannot completely mitigate the eﬀects of supply shocks on both inﬂation
and output, so states with highly volatile supply shocks could still impact the cost of price
adjustment. Thus, changes in ϕ(st) can be linked to changes in aggregate supply volatility.
In the next section, such a link is made explicit, where subsequent analysis then considers
implications for optimal monetary policy when aggregate supply shock volatility and ϕ(st)
change.
The Rotemberg (1982) approach of costly price adjustment is used instead of the Calvo
(1983) mechanism because the distribution of prices at time t under the Calvo mechanism is
no longer a simple convex combination of the lagged aggregate price level and optimal relative
price set at time t, since the average frequency of price adjustment evolves stochastically.
Also, the ﬁrm’s ﬁrst-order condition under the Rotemberg mechanism lends itself naturally to
a recursive formulation in the presence of switching coeﬃcients. Under the Calvo mechanism
with a changing frequency of repricing, the ﬁrm’s ﬁrst-order condition is an inﬁnite sum
embedding the changing coeﬃcients and is not as easily mapped into a recursive form. A
recursive formulation greatly simpliﬁes the analysis in the presence of Markov-switching
coeﬃcients. In the standard ﬁxed-regime setting, both approaches yield the same reduced-
form forward-looking Phillips curve. Whether this is also true under regime switching is not
clear, although it will likely be the case that regimes with a high frequency of repricing will
have a steeper Phillips-curve than in states with a low frequency of repricing. In a sense,
changes in the degree of the price adjustment cost (i.e. ϕ(st)) more broadly represent a
reduced-form description of changes in the price setting friction.
2.2 The Optimal Pricing Problem
Each of the monopolistically competitive intermediate-goods producing ﬁrms seek to maxi-









8where Δt+s is the representative household’s stochastic discount factor, Dt (j) are nominal
proﬁts of ﬁrm j ∈ [0,1], and Pt is the nominal aggregate price level. Also, ﬁrm j produces















where ψt denotes real marginal cost and yt (j)=nt(j) is the production of intermediate
goods by ﬁrm j using labor input nt(j).
There exists a ﬁnal-goods producing ﬁrm that purchases the intermediate inputs at nom-
inal prices Pt (j) and combines them into a ﬁnal good using the following constant-returns-
to-scale technology
Yt =








where θt > 1 ∀ t is the elasticityof substitution between goods. Variations in θt translate into
markup shocks of the ﬁrm’s price over its marginal cost. The proﬁt-maximization problem







For a given st, substituting (5)−(7) into (4) and diﬀerentiating with respect to Pt (j) yields
the ﬁrst-order condition








































which can be written as a system, where each equation represents the ﬁrst-order condition,
conditional on a particular state.
In a symmetric equilibrium, every ﬁrm faces the same ψt and Yt, so the pricing decision
is the same for all ﬁrms, implying Pt (j)=Pt. Also, steady-state inﬂation and output are





and ψt = θ
−1
t (θt − 1) are marginal costs in the ﬂexible-price case where ϕ(1) = ϕ(2) = 0.
Conditional expectations of inﬂation are Etπt+1 = E[πt+1|Ωt], where πt =l o g ( Π t/Π)
and Ωt represents information available at time t. Using the approach in Davig and Leeper
(2007), conditional expectations can be rewritten using a smaller information set excluding
the current state, Ω
−s
t ,w h e r eΩ t =Ω
−s
t ∪{ st}. Distributing probability mass over states at
t +1y i e l d s
Etπt+1 = E[πt+1
 











which uses the state-contingent notation that deﬁnes πt = πit ⇔ st = i for i =1 ,2. This
notation simply indicates that inﬂation at t depends on the regime at t, and not directly on
past regimes. When taking expectations of variables written in state-contingent notation,





Imposing symmetry and (9), a linear approximation to the ﬁrm’s optimal price-setting
equation can be written in terms of inﬂation using state-contingent notation as






  ψt + ut, (11)
and for st =2a s






  ψt + ut, (12)
where ϕi = ϕ(i)f o ri =1 ,2,   ψt =l o g ( ψt/ψ)a n dut is a markup, or aggregate supply,
shock. Interpreting these relations as a Phillips curve with state-dependent parameters, a






ψt + ut, (13)
for i =1 ,2, which reduces to the ﬁxed-regime speciﬁcation when either ϕi = ϕ for all i or
p11 = p22 =1 . 8 Equation (13) illustrates how changing costs of price adjustment manifest
8See Appendix A for detailed derivations of (11) and (12).
10themself in the coeﬃcients on marginal cost and expected inﬂation. Relatively sticky prices,
due to costly price adjustment, results in a ‘ﬂat’ Phillips curve, whereas less friction in price-
setting results in a ‘steep’ Phillips curve. Thus, a ﬂat Phillips curve implies that output gap
movements have a relatively small eﬀect on inﬂation and equilibrium adjustments to shocks
occur more so through quantities than prices.
3. The Switching Phillips Curve in a DSGE Model
This section explores some implications of the switching Phillips curve in an otherwise base-
line New Keynesian framework under a simple monetary rule. Analysis under a simple
monetary rule is useful for providing intuition of how the switching-Phillips curve aﬀects
aggregate dynamics. In particular, analytic expressions are available in the case of serially
uncorrelated shocks.
In addition to the switching-Phillips curve, the model contains a forward-looking IS equa-
tion that can be derived explicitly from a representative household’s optimization problem,












where Ct denotes the level of the composite consumption good and Nt is the composite of
labor services. The complete model in state-contingent notation resembles the prototypical
New Keynesian model, except for the coeﬃcients in the Phillips curve, and is given by
xit = Etxt+1 − σ
−1 (i − Etπt+1)+gt, (15)
πit = ϕ
−1
i βEt[ϕ(st+1)πt+1]+κixit + ut, (16)
iit = απit, (17)
where κi = ϕ
−1
i (θ − 1)(σ + η)f o ri =1 ,2. Disturbances to the intertemporal IS equation
(15), gt, are demand disturbances due to factors such as changes in government purchases.
11The switching-Phillips curve uses a measure of the output gap, xt, which is deﬁned as the
log deviation of output from it ﬂexible price level, in place of the marginal cost term.9
The exogenous disturbances are autoregressive and mutually uncorrelated,
gt = φgt−1 + υt, (18)
ut = ρut−1 + εt, (19)
where |φ| < 1, |ρ| < 1, υt ∼ N(0,σ υ (st)
2),ε t ∼ N(0,σ ε (st)
2)a n dE[υtεs] = 0 for all t
and s. The volatilities of the shocks, συ (st)a n dσε(st), are state dependent and switch
synchronously with changes in the term governing the cost of price adjustment. The relative
magnitudes of the state-dependent parameters are συ (1) >σ υ (2), σε(1) >σ ε(2) and ϕ(1) <
ϕ(2). This pattern of inequalities associates the state with relatively more volatile shocks,
st = 1, with the state having relatively lower costs of price adjustment.10
The switching volatility of the shocks does not have any implications for the ﬁrst-order
approximations, but are included simply to motivate the changes in the price adjustment
parameter. Also, the assumption that συ (st),σ ε(st)a n dϕ(st) all switch synchronously
may appear restrictive. However, this assumption bears little signiﬁcance, since each state-
dependent parameter may switch independently without aﬀecting the linear equilibrium
relations given by (15) and (16).11
A change in the state governing adjustment costs, st, does not aﬀect the steady state
values for inﬂation and the output gap. Thus, in the steady state, a change in st will not
generate any dynamics and ﬁrms simply adjust their price equal to steady state inﬂation.
Davig and Leeper (2007), using the approach in McCallum (1983), illustrate how to
9The relationship between the output gap and marginal cost term is given by   ψt =( σ + η)xt,w h e r e
xt = log(Yt/Y ∗). Y ∗ is the eﬃcient steady state level of output under ﬂexible prices, see Appendix D for
details.
10Again, these assumptions reﬂects similar patterns in estimates from Lubik and Schorfheide (2004) and
Smets and Wouters (2007).
11Nonsynchronous switching in the volatility of the shocks may have important implications for the full
underlying nonlinear model. See Davig and Leeper (2006) for an example of a nonlinear model with shocks
that have state-dependent volatilities switching nonsynchronously.
12solve Markov-switching rational expectations models using the method of undetermined
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Since there is no serial correlation in the shocks and no internal propagation mechanism, the
impact of the switching slope of the Phillips curve is contemporaneous and solutions match
their ﬁxed-regime counterparts. A state with a higher cost of price adjustment implies a
relativelysmall value for the slope of the Phillips curve, κ, resulting in output gap movements
having a small impact on inﬂation. So as κ declines, the impact of demand shocks on
inﬂation also declines. Supply shocks directly impact inﬂation, but are oﬀset by output gap
movements, where the extent of the oﬀsetting eﬀect increases as κ increases.
Similar intuitionapplies for seriallycorrelated shocks, but convenientanalytic expressions
are not available.12 To provide an example of the dynamics with serially correlated shocks,
numerical values are chosen as follows : α =1 .5, β = .99, σ =1 ,θ =1 0a n dφ = ρ = .75. For
values of the cost of adjustment parameters, one approach is to use estimates for the slope of
the Phillips curve from models that split the sample pre- and post-1980. For example, Lubik
and Schorfheide (2004) estimate a New Keynesian model using data from pre- and post-
Volckersubsamples. Although, Lubik and Schorfheide estimate a model with pricesadjusting
according to the Calvo mechanism, the implications for aggregate inﬂation dynamics are the
same as under quadratic price adjustment costs. Specifying a value for the steady state
markup and using their estimates for the slope of the Phillips curve in the two subsamples,
12Appendix B provides details how to compute the numerical solution on the minimum set of state vari-
ables.
13given by κ1 = .75 and κ2 = .58, implies values for the cost of adjustment parameters. Their
estimates also indicate higher volatility in both aggregate supply and demand disturbances
in the pre-Volcker era. Transition probabilities are set as p11 = p22 = .95, implying an
average duration for each regime of 20 quarters.13
Figure 1 reports the response to a demand shock conditional on the two diﬀerent states.
Although the variances of the shocks are diﬀerent across the two states, Figure 1 reports
responses for a demand shock of the same magnitude to highlight the diﬀerences arising
from Phillips curve speciﬁcation.14 For inﬂation, the responses in the two states are similar,
though the state with larger slope-coeﬃcient on the output gap (solid-line) exhibits a slightly
stronger response, reﬂecting the lower cost of price adjustment. The impact on output is
larger in the state with relatively high price adjustment costs (dashed-line), which also has
the lower value for the slope-coeﬃcient (i.e. κ2 = .58). In this state, ﬁrms meet higher
demand via the adjustment of quantities more so than their price.
Figure 2 reports the responses to a supply shock of equal magnitude conditional on each
state. Since supply shocks move inﬂation and output in opposite directions, an adverse
supply shock directly increases inﬂation, but is oﬀset to some extent by the downward
movement in output. The degree to which the decline in output attenuates the aﬀect of
a supply shock on inﬂation depends on the slope of the Phillips curve. For κ2 = .58, the
state with relatively high costs of price adjustment, the oﬀsetting eﬀect on inﬂation from
the decline in output is less than in the state with lower costs of price adjustment. Thus,
a positive aggregate supply disturbances generates relatively more inﬂation despite ﬁrms
having a higher cost of price adjustment. As Figure 2 illustrates, these factors imply that
the volatility of both inﬂation and output rises in response to aggregate supply shocks as
the Phillips curve ﬂattens.
13Since Lubik and Schorfheide (2004) do not estimate a Markov-switching model, there is little guidance
on specifying the transition probabilities.
14The size of the shock is equal to an across-regime average of a two standard-deviation demand shock
from Lubik and Schorfheide (2004).
144. Optimal Discretionary Policy with an Ad-hoc Loss
Short-run inﬂation dynamics have an important impact on the appropriate conduct of mon-
etary policy. Optimal policy under discretion, such as in Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (1999),
instructs policy to ‘lean against the wind’, meaning that the central bank should contract ag-
gregate demand when inﬂation rises. The extent of the response depends on two factors: the
slope of the Phillips curve and the weight policymakers assign to output gap deviations. A
Phillips curve with a steep slope allows the central bank to exert considerable inﬂuence over
inﬂation by contracting aggregate demand, which is tempered by concerns over output gap
stability. If the slope of the Phillips curve changes, implying the inﬂuence output gap move-
ments exert on inﬂation also changes, then should the central bank vary how aggressively it
‘leans against the wind’? The answer to this question is sensitive to the assumptions made
concerning the central bank’s loss function. Similar to Blake and Zampolli (2006), Moessner
(2006), Zampolli (2006) and Svensson and Williams (2007), the answer given in this sec-
tion, under an ad-hoc loss, is ‘yes’ - the central bank should vary the systematic response
of the output gap to movements in inﬂation. However, this result is sensitive to the ad-hoc
speciﬁcation for the loss function, as will be evident in the following section.
4.1 State-Contingent Targeting Rules
















where λ is the relative weight on output deviations. Rotember and Woodford (1997) and
Woodford (2003) derivea loss function with the same form as (22) using a second-order Taylor
series expansion to the representative household’s expected utility function. An advantage
of this approach is that it yields a utility-based value for λ that depends on structural
parameters of the model, one of which is the slope-coeﬃcient on the marginal cost term in
the Phillips curve. Given this parameter is subject to change, the current assumption that
15λ is constant is most-likely to be misleading concerning optimal monetary policy. The next
section derives the relevant utility-based welfare criterion when the term governing the cost
of price adjustment is subject to change. However, using the ad-hoc loss above is useful as
a starting benchmark.
The optimal discretionary policy minimizes (22) subject to the switching-Phillips curve
πit = ϕ
−1
i βEt [ϕ(st+1)πt+1]+κixit + ut, (23)
for i =1 ,2, under the assumption that policy actions do not aﬀect private agents’ expecta-
tions. Since the optimization problem is static, the central bank only needs to be concerned
with setting policy based on the current state and does not need to take into account how
states evolve going forward. A ﬁrst-order condition exists for each state, summarized by the





for i =1 ,2, indicating the central bank should optimally vary how aggressively it acts to
oﬀset aggregate supply disturbances depending on the state. In states with relatively low
costs of price adjustment, such as st = 1, inﬂation is relatively responsive to changes in the
output gap. The optimal targeting rule for st = 1 instructs policy to use this leverage and
adjust the output gap by a greater amount, relative to st =2 , in response to a given value
for inﬂation. So with κ1 >κ 2, the central bank sets policy to adjust aggregate demand more
aggressively when st =1t h a nw h e nst =2 .
Although the optimal policy is under discretion, the central bank has committed to
behave in a certain way in each state. The more aggressive policy in the state with lower costs
of price adjustment works to control expectations of future inﬂation, mitigating the impact
of shocks on inﬂation in the state with higher costs of price adjustment. In the U.S., the
Volcker disinﬂation represents an episode where rather large output losses were tolerated to
reduce inﬂation. To the extent this episode remains embedded in expectations, the optimal
discretionary solution suggests how this episode has beneﬁtted subsequent policymakers.
16Leeper and Zha (2003) refer to these eﬀects, arising from the potential of future regime
change, as expectation formations eﬀects. If private expectations anticipate a regime with
very aggressive monetary policy, these actions control expected inﬂation and consequently,
current inﬂation.
4.2 Conditional Eﬃciency Frontiers
Taylor (1979) demonstrates that aggregate supply shocks force upon policymakers a trade-
oﬀ between inﬂation and output volatility. The position of the optimal trade-oﬀ frontier, or
eﬃciency frontier, depends on the variance of the underlying aggregate supply shocks and
structural parameters of the model. The weight policy makers place on output gap stabiliza-
tion determines the point on the frontier minimizing the ad-hoc loss function. In the current
framework with changing structural parameters, there exist conditional frontiers depending
on the current state. For example, Figure 3 reports the frontiers using the parameterization
in the previous section, except closing the model with optimal discretionary policy under
the assumption λ = .25.15 The variance of the underlying aggregate supply disturbance
is temporarily assumed to be constant across states to isolate the eﬀects of the switching
slope-coeﬃcient in the Phillips curve.
The frontier conditional on the κ1 state is more favorable compared to the κ2 state with
the smaller slope-coeﬃcient on the output gap. To understand the more favorable trade-oﬀ
for κ1, it is useful to consider a central bank that strictly targets inﬂation, where λ =0 .I n
this case, the central bank adjusts the output gap to any extent necessary to achieve zero
inﬂation in both states. However, output volatility will diﬀer across states if κ1  = κ2.I f
λ = 0, then the output gap response to an aggregate supply shock is ai = κ
−1
i , indicating the
central bank adjusts the output gap inversely to the slope-coeﬃcient in the Phillips curve.
For κ1, ﬁrms face lower costs when adjusting prices so output gap movements are relatively
eﬀective at stabilizing inﬂation. For κ2, inﬂation is less responsive to output gap movements,
so the central bank must induce larger movements to attain the same magnitude of inﬂation
15See Appendix C for details.
17volatility. So, output volatility for st = 1 is less than for st = 2, even though inﬂation
volatility is zero in each state.
Given some concern over output gap stability, so λ>0, the central bank will still adjust
the output gap relatively more for a given supply shock under κ2, but permits some inﬂation
volatility. The concern over output gap stability results in relatively more inﬂation and
output volatility under κ2, causing the eﬃciency frontier for st = 2 to lie outside of the
frontier for st =1 . 16
Figure 3 may appear paradoxical since the frontier for κ1, roughly representing the pre-
Volcker period, lies inside the frontier with the smaller κ2. Evidence supporting the Great
Moderation, such as McConnell and Perez-Quiros (2000) and Stock and Watson (2003),
indicates the pre-Volcker period was more volatile than the post-1982 period, seeming to
suggest a reversal of the relative position of the two frontiers. The apparent paradox arises
for two reasons : 1) the frontiers represent the volatility trade-oﬀ under optimal discretionary
policy, which is unlikely to be an accurate characterization of U.S. monetary policy in the
1970s and 2) empirical evidence suggest the volatility of exogenous shocks is lower in the
post-1982 period.
Substantial empirical evidence suggests monetary policy was systematically less aggres-
sive in the 1970s than afterward.17 Using the ad-hoc loss, the optimal policy under discretion
advises exactly the opposite. In states with a large slope-coeﬃcient on the output gap, as in
the 1970s, monetary policy should react systematically more aggressively to inﬂation. Due
to the likely non-optimal monetary policy in the 1970s, the economy was operating well away
from its optimal frontier in the pre-Volcker era.
Allowing the variance of the supply shock to vary across states, as the original model
speciﬁcation indicates, can reverse the relative position of the two frontiers in Figure 3.
Using the estimates of aggregate supply volatility from Lubik and Schorfheide (2004) for the
16Although the frontier for κ1 always lies inside of κ2, assuming a constant variance of supply shocks across
states and κ1 >κ 2, output volatility for κ1 will eventually exceed that for κ2 for a high enough value of λ.
17For example, see Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (2000).
18pre- and post-Volcker periods, setting σε (1) = 1.16 and σε(2) = .64 yields the conditional
eﬃciency frontiers in Figure 4.
The ﬂattening of the Phillips curve in the context of the Great Moderation raises an
interesting implication. As Figure 3 indicates, which keeps the volatility of shocks constant
across states, a ﬂatter Phillips curve implies higher inﬂation and output volatility in the
post-1982 period. Given this contradicts the empirical evidence of the Great Moderation,
the implication is that the volatility of aggregate supply shocks had to decline. In other
words, if the Phillips curve ﬂattens, then better conduct of monetary policy by itself cannot
bring about a moderation in both inﬂation and output volatility- there must also be a decline
in the volatility of the underlying aggregate supply shocks. However, if monetary policy is
clearly sub-optimal, a distinct possibility in the pre-1982 period, then a shift to a regime
more closely resembling optimal policy can also bring about a decline in both inﬂation and
output.
5. A Utility-Based Welfare Criterion
A loss function in squared deviations of the output gap and inﬂation from their steady
state values is a common speciﬁcation, such as Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (1999). Woodford
(2003), however, shows how a second-order approximation to the expected utility of the
consumer under the assumption of staggered price-setting as in Calvo (1983) gives rise to
a loss function of this form, where the weight on the output gap term is a function of
the frequency of price adjustment. Eusepi (2005) derives the utility-based welfare function
for price adjustment subject to quadratic costs, as in Rotemberg (1982), and shows how
the weight on the output gap term depends on the parameter governing the cost of price
adjustment. In a setting where this cost can change, this section shows how the weight
on the output gap also changes with the cost of price adjustment and how this aﬀects the
optimal policy under discretion.















indicating that the weight on output gap deviations depends on the state governing the cost
of price adjustment. If the utility function has log consumption and is linear in labor, so
σ =1a n dη = 0, then (26) is simply λi = ϕ
−1
i . Thus, the utility-based welfare criteria is a
loss function featuring a state-dependent weight on the output gap term.
In a state with a relatively low cost of price adjustment, deviations in inﬂation create
a small loss, so the weight on the output gap is relatively high. Conversely, in a state
with a high cost of price adjustment, deviations in inﬂation are costly, so the central bank
should place less emphasis on output stabilization. This intuition is similar to that from
the utility-based welfare criteria derived under the Calvo mechanism of price adjustment,
as in Woodford (2003). When the price adjustment is infrequent, losses arise from price
dispersion, so the central bank should place low weight on output stabilization relative to
the case when price adjustment occurs more frequently.
Minimizing the central bank’s utility-based loss function subject to the switching-Phillips
curve under the assumption that policy actions do not aﬀect private agents’ expectations





or after substituting for λi and κi, which reduce to
xit =( 1− θ)πit, (28)
indicating the central bank should not optimally vary how aggressively it acts to oﬀset aggre-
gate supply disturbances. The optimal targeting rule is a constant relation between output
20and inﬂation, independent of the state, depending only upon the elasticity of substitution
between goods. This result diﬀers from the optimal discretionary policy under an ad-hoc
loss, where the optimal discretionary policy instructs the central bank to switch policies in
accordance with the structure of the economy.
In the state with relatively high costs of price adjustment, both the weight attached to
output gap stabilization and the slope-coeﬃcient in the Phillips curve are relatively small.
Under an ad-hoc loss, a low slope-coeﬃcient directs policy to reduce the systematic output
gap response to inﬂation deviations precisely because such movements are less eﬀective at
stabilizing inﬂation. However, it is in states with a low-slope coeﬃcient, or high costs of
price adjustment, when inﬂation volatility is more costly to ﬁrms. The utility-based welfare
criterion reﬂects this higher cost of inﬂation volatility by down-weighting the emphasis on
output gap stabilization.
Thus, in the high-cost state, two opposing forcesexactly oﬀset to bring about the invariant
policy response : 1) a lower slope-coeﬃcient on the output gap, which directs policy to
reduce output gap movements to stabilize inﬂation and 2) a lower weight on the output
gap, which directs policy to increase output gap movements to stabilize inﬂation. These two
eﬀects exactly oﬀset under the assumption of switching quadratic costs of adjustment.18 The
diﬀerence in comparison to the optimal policy under the ad-hoc loss function is that it only
accounts for the ﬁrst factor, the change in the slope of the Phillips curve, and ignores the
welfare implications of inﬂation in the diﬀerent states.
6. Conclusion
This paper shows that changing costs of price adjustment can generate instability in a
forward-looking Phillips curve relation. In particular, the coeﬃcients on both expected
inﬂation and marginal cost, or the output gap, are subject to change in coordination with
changes in the state governing the cost of adjusting prices. In addition, Phillips curve
18Analogous reasoning applies to the low-cost state.
21instability has implications for optimal monetary policy. Under an ad-hoc welfare criterion,
the optimal policy adjusts the systematic component of policy along with changes in the
state. However, since the microfoundations of the ﬁrm’s optimization problem are explicitly
stated, it is possible to derive a utility-based welfare metric. A novel feature of this metric is
that it has a state-dependent weight on the output gap term. The weight depends inversely
on the cost of price adjustment, so in the low cost state, relatively more weight is placed on
output stabilization. The implication for optimal monetary policy under discretion is that
policy should not vary the systematic component of policy. This result stands in contrast
to the prescription coming under the ad-hoc criterion, which recommends the systematic
component of policy change with the state.
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25APPENDIX
A. Deriving the Switching Phillips Curve
For st =1 , the conditional ﬁrst-order condition after distributing the ϕ(st+1)t e r mi s





















































where Pt+1 (i,j) represents the nominal price for ﬁrm j when st+1 = i and Yt+1(i)r e p r e s e n t s
ﬁnal output when st+1 = i. An analogous ﬁrst-order condition exists for st = 2, except p11 is
replaced with (1 − p22)a n d( 1− p11) is replaced with p22.U s i n g( A − 1), the ﬁrm’s optimal
pricing condition for st =1 , after imposing Pt (j)=Pt, is given by














































where substituting in Pt/Pt−1 =Π t yields



































































1+  Δt+1 (1)
 
πt+1(1)(1 + πt+1 (1))(1 + Yt+1 (1))(1 − Yt)
 
+




1+  Δt+1 (2)
 
πt+1 (2)(1 + πt+1 (2))(1 + Yt+1 (2))(1 − Yt)
 
,
where πt =l o g ( Π t/Π),   Δt =l o g ( Δ t/Δ),   ψt =l o g ( ψt/ψ)a n d  θt =l o g ( θt/θ). Values
without a time subscript are steady state values. Eliminating higher-order terms and using
ψ = θ−1 (θ − 1) yields






  ψt + ut, (A-5)
where ut = −  θt. The same approach is taken for st = 2, where the general representation
can be rewritten as (13).
B. Solving the NK Model with the Switching-Phillips
Curve
The posited solutions (20)−(21) can be substituted into the structural equations (15)−(16)
to yield systems that relate the structural parameters to the solution coeﬃcients. For supply





α − p11ρ −(1 − p11)ρ 1 − p11ρ −(1 − p11)ρ
−(1 − p22)ρα − p22ρ −(1 − p22)ρ 1 − p22ρ
1 − βp11ρ −β (1 − p11)
ϕ2
ϕ1ρ −κ1 0
−β (1 − p22)
ϕ1


































α − p11φ −(1 − p11)φ 1 − p11φ −(1 − p11)φ
−(1 − p22)φα − p22φ −(1 − p22)φ 1 − p22φ
1 − βp11φ −β (1 − p11)
ϕ2
ϕ1φ −κ1 0
−β (1 − p22)
ϕ1





























C. Solving for Dynamics and Computing Eﬃciency Fron-
tiers Under Optimal Discretionary Policy
To compute the eﬃciency frontiers under the ad-hoc loss function, ﬁrst solve for the dynamics
of output and inﬂation under the discretionary policy. Use the system of targeting rules in
(24), which in state-contingent notation is
 
λp11 λ(1 − p11)







−κ1p11 −κ2 (1 − p11)















Substituting (A − 6)−(A − 7) into the switching-Phillips curve (23) yields a dynamic system























where γi = λβ (λ + κ2
i)
−1 and i =1 ,2.
Dynamics for the above system can be solved as before, using the method of undeter-
mined coeﬃcients on the minimum set of state variables. Monetary policy completely oﬀsets
28disturbances to the IS equation, so the state variables are st and ut. Decision rules then have
the form
xit = aiut, (A-9)



























βa1ρut − κ2a2ut − ut, (A-12)




































The locus of points describing the eﬃciency frontier are then given by computing the
unconditional variance of xit and πit using (A − 9) and (A − 10), conditional on i,f o ra
grid of values over λ. Under the utility-based approach, dynamics and the corresponding
eﬃciency frontiers can be derived in an analogous way.
D. Deriving the Utility-Based Welfare Criterion Un-
der Switching Costs of Price Adjustment












29where Ct is the composite good and Nt is time spent working. Firm level production function
is
yt (j)=nt(j), (A-15)



















However, a constant employment subsidy exists that is proportional to the households labor
income, which oﬀsets the ineﬃciently low level of production in the steady state arising
from monopolistic distortions. Under perfectly ﬂexible prices, ﬁrms set their relative price
e q u a lt oam a r k u pμ>1 that exceeds their marginal cost of production. The employment
subsidy given to households, ﬁnanced by lump-sum taxes on households, results in an eﬃcient
steady state level of production. Monetary policy then focuses on stabilization policies,
versus policies to undo the monopolistic distortions. In the deterministic steady state, the
monopolistic ﬁrm is not adjusting its price, so the changing parameter governing the costs












where the subsidy is (1 + s)=μ.
The aggregate resource constraint is





















The second-order approximation to the ﬁrst term of the representative agent’s period utility

























where ϕi = ϕ(st)f o rst = i,   Yt = Yt−Y and   πt =Π t−Π. Using the following approximations,
































































































t + t.i.p. (A-25)










1+η (1 + η)Y
2
t + t.i.p. (A-26)
31Combining both components of the utility function and removing t.i.p. yields






























and rearranging terms yields




































(1 − σ − (1 − Φ)(1 + η)) Y
2

































Removing the distortion creating the ineﬃciently low steady state level of output with the
subsidy, so Φ = 0, yields


























where xt = Yt − Y ∗,w h e r eY ∗ =1f r o m( A − 18) represents the eﬃcient level of output in
the steady state and is independent of monetary policy.

















































































Figure 1: Conditional impulse responses to an aggregate demand shock under a simple
monetary rule.















































































Figure 2: Conditional impulse responses to an aggregate supply shock under a simple mon-
etary rule.



















Figure 3: Conditional inﬂation-output volatility tradeoﬀs (Constant supply shock variance).


















Figure 4: Conditional inﬂation-output volatility tradeoﬀs (State-dependent supply shock
variances set to Lubik and Schorfheide (2004) estimates).
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